Seveso disaster - Wikipedia. The Seveso disaster was an industrial accident that occurred around 1. July 1. 0, 1. 97. Milan in the Lombardy region of Italy. It resulted in the highest known exposure to 2,3,7,8- tetrachlorodibenzo- p- dioxin (TCDD) in residential populations. The EU industrial safety regulations are known as the Seveso II Directive. Location of disaster. Http:// Bejegyezte: Vali konyha d. Subscribe Subscribed Unsubscribe 1,159 1K. Title: Trainwreck (2015) 6.3 /10. Want to share IMDb's rating on your own site? You must be a registered. Katasztrofa.lap.hu Linkaj. This page was last modified on 6 November 2015, at 22:13. Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply. This is a file from the Wikimedia Commons. Information from its description page there is shown below. Commons is a freely licensed media file repository. Other affected neighbouring communities were Meda (1. Desio (3. 3,0. 00), Cesano Maderno (3. Barlassina (6,0. 00) and Bovisio- Masciago (1. The factory building had been built many years earlier and the local population did not perceive it as a potential source of danger. Moreover, although several exposures of populations to dioxins had occurred before, mostly in industrial accidents, they were of a more limited scale. Chemical events. The chemical 2,4,5- trichlorophenol (2) was being produced there from 1,2,4,5- tetrachlorobenzene (1) by the nucleophilic aromatic substitution reaction with sodium hydroxide. The 2,4,5- trichlorophenol was intended as an intermediate for hexachlorophene. The exhaust steam pressure was normally 1. Safety testing showed the onset of an exothermic side reaction if the reaction mixture temperature reached 2. Crucially, no steam temperature reading was made available to plant operators responsible for the reactor. The chemical- release accident occurred when a batch process was interrupted prior to the completion of the final step . Other parts of the site had already started to close down as the processing of other batches finished, which reduced power consumption across the plant, causing a dramatic drop in the load on the turbine and a consequent increase in the temperature of the exhaust steam to around 3. This much hotter steam then proceeded to heat the portion of the metal wall of the accident reactor above the level of the liquid within it to the same temperature. Not having a steam temperature reading among their instruments, operators of the reactor were unaware of the presence of this additional heating, and they stopped the batch as they normally would . The abnormally- hot upper region of the reactor jacket then heated the adjacent reaction mixture. With the stirrer not running, the heating was highly localised . Indeed, the critical temperature proved to be only 1. At that lower critical temperature, a slow runaway decomposition began, releasing more heat and leading to the onset of a rapid runaway reaction when the temperature reached 2. At the nominal reaction temperature, TCDD is normally seen only in trace amounts of less than 1 ppm (parts per million). Zone A was further split into 7 sub- zones. The local population was advised not to touch or eat locally grown fruits or vegetables. Zone A had a TCDD soil concentration of > 5. Emergency slaughtering commenced to prevent TCDD from entering the food chain, and by 1. By the end of August, Zone A had been completely evacuated and fenced, 1,6. An advice center was set up for pregnant women of which only 2. Another 4. 60 women brought on their pregnancies without problems, their children not showing any sign of malformation or pathologies. Two government commissions were established to develop a plan for quarantining and decontaminating the area, for which the Italian government allotted 4. US $4. 7. 8 million). This amount would be tripled two years later. Studies on immediate and long- term health effects. The most evident adverse health effect ascertained was chloracne (1. Other early effects noted were peripheral neuropathy and liver enzyme induction. The ascertainment of other, possibly severe sequelae of dioxin exposure (e. A study published in 1. Early health investigations including liver function, immune function, neurologic impairment, and reproductive effects yielded inconclusive results. An excess mortality from cardiovascular and respiratory diseases was uncovered, and excess of diabetes cases was also found. Results of cancer incidence and mortality follow- up showed an increased occurrence of cancer of the gastrointestinal sites and of the lymphatic and hematopoietic tissue. Results cannot be viewed as final or comprehensive, however, because of various limitations: the lack of individual exposure data, short latency period, and small population size for certain cancer types. A 2. 00. 1 study. In 2. 00. 9, an update including 5 more years (up to 1. Shortly after ICMESA began to pay the first compensations to those affected. Later that spring decontamination operations were initiated and in June a system epidemiological health monitoring for 2. They then used trichlorophenol to make a drug to fight the skin infections, which they tested in dogs. In June 1. 97. 8, the Italian government raised its special loan from 4. By the end of the year most individual compensation claims had been settled out of court. On February 5, 1. Paolo Paoletti . The total amount would reach 2. Waste from the cleanup. This waste was packed into waste drums which had been designed for the storage of nuclear waste. It was agreed that the waste would be disposed of in a legal manner. To this end, in spring 1. Mannesmann Italiana was contracted to dispose of the contaminated chemicals from Zone A. Mannesmann Italiana made it a condition that Givaudan would not be notified of the disposal site which prompted Givaudan to insist that a notary public certify the disposal. On September 9, 4. ICMESA premises. On December 1. However, in February 1. A public debate ensued in which numerous theories were put forward when it was found that Mannesmann Italiana had hired two subcontractors to get rid of the toxic waste. On May 1. 9 the 4. Anguilcourt- le- Sart, a village in northern France. From there they were transferred to a French military base near Sissonne. The Roche Group (parent firm of Givaudan) took it upon itself to properly dispose of the waste. On November 2. 5, over nine years after the disaster, the Roche Group issued a public statement that the toxic waste consisting of 4. Switzerland. According to New Scientist it was thought that the high chlorine content of the waste might cause damage to the high temperature incinerator used by Roche, but Roche stated that they would burn the waste in the incinerator and repair it afterward if it were damaged. They stated that they wanted to take responsibility for the safe destruction of the waste. Criminal court case. They all appealed. In May 1. 98. 5, the Court of Appeal in Milan found three of the five accused not guilty; the two still facing prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court in Rome. On May 2. 3, 1. 98. Supreme Court in Rome confirmed the judgment against the two remaining defendants, even though the prosecuting attorney had called for their acquittal. Aftermath. At least a week passed before it was publicly stated that dioxin had been emitted and another week passed before evacuation began (the government had to control which area was mostly polluted and, after that, to organise everything for the evacuated people). Even worse, the factory's safety measures weren't created to preserve also the external environment. As a result, the local population was caught unaware when the accident happened and unprepared to cope with the danger of an invisible poison. In the context of such heightened tensions, Seveso became a microcosm where all the existing conflicts within society (political, institutional, religious, industrial) were reflected. However, within a relatively short time such conflicts abated and the recovery of the community proceeded. For, in Seveso, the responsible party was known from the outset and soon offered reparation. Moreover, the eventual disappearance of the offending factory itself and the physical exportation of the toxic substances and polluted soil enabled the community to feel cleansed. The resolution of the emotional after- effects of the trauma, so necessary for the recovery of a community, was facilitated by these favourable circumstances. The Seveso Directive was updated in 1. Seveso II Directive (or COMAH Regulations in the United Kingdom). Treatment of the soil in the affected areas was almost perfect; the area now has a dioxin level below the normal level. The whole site has been turned into a public park, Seveso Oak Forest park. This is a really important place for the inhabitants of Seveso, and it's a protected area, where it's forbidden to build anything (roads, buildings..). There are two artificial hills in the park; today, under these hills there is all what remains of the toxic area (destroyed houses, tons of poisoned dirt, animal corpses..), protected in a cement sarcophagus. Some inspections under them declared the sarcophagus has to resist for almost 3. Several studies have been completed on the health of the population of surrounding communities. While it has been established that people from Seveso exposed to TCDD are more susceptible to certain rare cancers, when all types of cancers are grouped into one category, no statistically significant excess has yet been observed. This indicates that more research is needed to determine the true long- term health effects on the affected population. Epidemiological monitoring programmes established as follows (with termination dates): abortions (1. Health monitoring of workers at ICMESA and on decontamination projects, and chloracne sufferers (1. The Seveso disaster gives valuable comparative insight into the effects of Agent Orange on flora and fauna in Vietnam, not to mention the Vietnamese people, as TCDD was a significant contaminant in Agent Orange. Patterson, Jr., Steven Samuels, Wayman Turner, Pier Mario Gerthoux, and Paolo Brambilla (January 2. Environmental Health Perspectives. United Nations University. Kletz What Went Wrong? Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters(1. Gulf, ISBN 0- 8. 84. Kletz, Trevor A. Learning from Accidents, 3rd edition. Oxford U. K.: Gulf Professional. ISBN 9. 78- 0- 7. Nature Publishing Group. Nature Publishing Group. Lessons and results from Seveso. The Science of the Total Environment.
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